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The article by Keil et al. [1] considers the handling of the
2009 pandemic in Europe and speciﬁcally criticises WHO.
The jury is out on WHO’s role until the ﬁnal report of the
independent Fineberg Committee emerges (a preview of
the report was published in March 2011 and the ﬁnal report
will be considered by the World Health Assembly in May
[2]). The Keil et al. article makes some good points similar
to those of the Fineberg preview; namely that the
description of pandemics needs to be re-cast, that surveil-
lance of inﬂuenza should be strengthened and that advice to
WHO and other bodies should be made more public with
transparent conﬂicts of interest [1, 2]. At the same time the
article unfortunately repeats without question some of the
myths concerning the 2009 pandemic that ECDC has pre-
viously corrected (e.g. that the international deﬁnition of a
pandemic was changed in 2009) [3]. It also invents a new
myth, that improving social conditions is the most effective
way to prevent pandemics of infectious disease [1].
European policy-makers and politicians are put in a hard
place by the prospect of modern inﬂuenza pandemics. They
don’t know when one is going to happen, where it will start
or what it will be like. The only certainty is that future
inﬂuenza pandemics will occur and they will be unpredi-
catable [2]. There are effective preparations and counter-
measures; preparing hospitals, making essential services
more robust and vaccines, antivirals and other medical
treatments that worked in the 2009 pandemic [4, 5]. So not
to make preparations would be neglectful. Hence prudent
European policy-makers, led by the EU institutions like the
European Commission and ECDC as well as WHO,
invested in preparations between 2005 and 2008 [6–8].
Many followed the precautionary principle and prepared
for something towards the severe end of historical experi-
ence. That made particular sense for investments in phar-
maceutical countermeasures. If the countries did not have
stockpiles (for antivirals and other consumables) or prior
contracts with manufacturers (for vaccines) the countries
would have very little of these essential drugs and vaccines
available in the event of a challenging pandemic [2].
In all this unpredictability it seems one certainty was
that when a pandemic happened the policy makers would
be criticised. If it was a bad pandemic they would be
criticised for not doing enough. If it was not so bad (and
ECDC and others have argued that the 2009 was about the
best pandemic Europe could have hoped for) [9] they
would be criticised for over-preparation, wastefulness and
shroud-waving [1]. Politicians are used to this but the
public health community needs to now examine the criti-
cisms and learn the right lessons [2, 3, 9].
There have been many evaluations of the handling of the
2009 pandemic and ECDC maintains a compilation of
national and international evaluations [10]. An early and
rapid evaluation was by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe and that has been questioned for its
scientiﬁc basis [3, 9, 11]. Most other ones (like that of the
recent European Parliament) have been critical but tech-
nical and more even-handed [10, 12]. Some learning points
are self-evident and accepted by ECDC which has bene-
ﬁtting from the numerous evaluations (the Centre would
certainly not claim to be the ﬁrst to have thought of them)
and some of those within the Centre’s mandate are already
being acted upon (Table 1).
By implication Keil et al. move on to criticise the modern
public health approach to tuberculosis control (case ﬁnding
and ensuring completion of proper antimicrobial treatment)
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associated with reduced mortality from tuberculosis in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century before antimicrobial
treatments became available and conclude that the most
effective way to preventing any infectious disease pandemic
is to invest in the improvement of social conditions [1].
Certainly improving social conditions will mitigate the
impact of inﬂuenza pandemics [14]. But at the same time it
does not follow that a country being socially and economi-
cally developed willprotectitagainstmoderninfectionsand
pandemics. Certainly improved social conditions will not
prevent pandemics and it is also wrong to imply that case-
ﬁnding and proper treatment for tuberculosis in Europe and
elsewhere is misguided. Where both improving social
Table 1 A selection of the more important lessons to be learnt in Europe from the 2009 Pandemic [9]
Topics Learning point Notes
Planning scenarios Countries and plans to be ﬂexible—preparing
for a range of scenarios [2]
Undertake more operational planning and
preparation at the delivery end [2, 3, 8, 9]
This means determining how for example how vaccines will be
delivered, intensive care capacity increased quickly using
tools like WHO’s checklist and ECDC’s Acid Tests as a
starting point [7]
Early analyses Early assessments should be more structured and
rehearsed annually for seasonal inﬂuenza [2]
This was done for the 2010-11 seasonal inﬂuenza epidemics in
Europe by ECDC and its advisors through a structured risk
assessment
There need to be more sophisticated descriptions of
pandemics, the severity reﬂecting the inherent
complexity of the pandemics and their
countermeasures [2]
ECDC is taking a lead in developing this for Europe working
with Member States and WHO using seasonal inﬂuenza as a
model
The results of important analyses need to be shared
in a more timely manner between countries [2]
Problems arose from the need for independent peer-review and
authorities producing analyses but not necessarily thinking
who else needed to know the results
Surveillance Surveillance needs to be better targeted to answer
certain essential questions and particular
weaknesses (surveillance in hospitals, mortality
surveillance and seroepidemiology) need to be
addressed using seasonal inﬂuenza as a model [25]
A general ﬁnding was the near impossibility of establishing
new surveillance and other systems during a crisis like a
pandemic (e.g. surveillance in hospitals). In contrast pre-
existing systems, primary care and virological surveillance
worked well
Decision making in
the pandemic
There should be more formal if rapid independent
reviews of earlier decisions at national and
international levels [2, 26]
This did happen in a number of circumstances learning from
earlier recommendations [24]
Opinion giving should be transparent with those
advising being identiﬁed and with public
declarations of interest [2]
An adviser having a conﬂict of interest does not mean that their
advice is incorrect or should be discounted. There are certain
areas (e.g. pharmaceutical development) where conﬂicts of
interest are inevitable among those giving advice
Communications Prepare the population and professionals for a range
of possibilities [2, 9]
A particular problem was that the public and decision makers
thought they had been promised a severe pandemic [27]
The opinions, concerns and views of the public and
professionals should be monitored at national
levels during a pandemic and responded to rapidly
This was done in a few countries notably the United States.
Professionals are especially important for pandemics as it is
they who need to deliver the countermeasures like early
medical treatments, antivirals and vaccines to the public
A disconnect between technical epidemicological
and virological risk assessments and the
politically-driven risk management process was
evident and partially fuelled by the media
coverage in early days of the 2009 pandemic [28]
Many public health authorities are poorly equipped
to deal with the multi-source two-way
communication platforms that the internet and
social media allows today
This was one of the reasons leading to a variable public health
response in some countries, especially when it came to
vaccinations [28, 29]
Essential research
and development
It should be more possible to rapidly commission
essential research in a pandemic
Some countries were able to do this but current European
Union rules and procedures make it almost impossible to use
EU monies for this
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undertaken their effect has been additive [13, 15–17]. It has
also been suggested that further improvement of socioeco-
nomic conditions might not have further impact on TB
prevalencebeyondacertainthresholdofburden,particularly
in low incidence settings [18]. Hence the danger of Keil
et al’s statement on tuberculosis is that countries with a high
social standard could become complacent [1].
This moves onto the whole issue of where to place
infectious diseases in health care priorities in Europe,
especially those that affect younger persons (those under
age 65 years) and are preventable by vaccines. Many of
these vaccines are effective and inexpensive on a per capita
basis. Keil et al. [1] rightly point to the growing burden
from potentially preventable chronic conditions; type II
diabetes, lung cancer, cardiovascular and circulatory con-
ditions. Certainly there should be investment in the pre-
vention of those conditions but that is not an argument for
neglecting preventable and treatable infections. Overall the
European ‘report-card’ on vaccine preventable diseases
reads ‘must do better’. There are substantial cohorts of
undervaccinated children and young adults in many Euro-
pean countries. In some countries this has to do with low
resources but in a substantial number of countries this has
more to do with attitudes and behaviours (opponents of
vaccination, doubts over safety and complacency over the
threats from infection). As a result infections like rubella,
measles, mumps and whooping cough have been returning
[19–23]. Investing in the improvement of social conditions
maybe could beneﬁt the outcome of some severe cases and
some fatalities will be prevented with better access to
health care—but it will have a very limited impact on the
spread of such diseases. The burden from the vaccine
preventable diseases (including the ‘new’ seasonal inﬂu-
enza) is unnecessarily high because coverage of vaccina-
tion varies so greatly across the EU. Because of that all
health ministers agreed to improve coverage rates for
inﬂuenza [24]. Hopefully such commitments will also be
given for the childhood vaccine preventable diseases.
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